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Thursday, October 31, 2024

Why the Higher Education Inquirer Continues to Gain Popularity

The Higher Education Inquirer (HEI) continues to grow, with no revenues, no advertising, and no SEO help. And for good reason. HEI fills a niche for student/consumers and workers and their allies. It provides valuable information about how the US higher education system works and what folks can do to navigate that system.

We cover layoffs and union organizing and strikes in higher education, and we expose predators with some degree of risk-risk that other outlets often won't take. We take a stand on holding big business accountable and we side with struggling student debtors and their families. We question and interrogate higher ducation technology and credentials. And we dispel myths, disinformation, and hype.

We research documents of all sorts, including information from the US Department of Education, Securities and Exchange Commission, Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of Defense, Department of Labor, and Federal Election Commission.

The Higher Education Inquirer provides trustworthy information and expert opinions and analysis. Our list of authors is diverse and impressive, for many reasons. HEI treats our readers with respect. It gives students and workers a voice, accepting information and evidence from whistleblowers. And it allows for comments (including anonymous comments), comments that we value.

When others do accept our research, we appreciate it. HEI has been a background source for the NY Times, Bloomberg, Chronicle of Higher Education, ProPublica, Forbes, Military Times, the American Prospect, and several other outlets. We strive to be ahead of the learned herd.

Thursday, July 25, 2024

2U Declares Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. Will Anyone Else Name All The Elite Universities That Were Complicit?

2U declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy today and the company is now valued at less than $5M. That's a small shadow of the $5.4B perceived value it had in mid-2018.

As a company that will be owned and operated by vulture capitalists (VCs), 2U (TWOU) and its subsidiary edX will fall below the radar. But that won't stop the company from ensnaring more students for overpriced "elite" and "brand name" degrees and certificates--as it tries to survive. In fact, it might make it easier. The visible economic market and its media won't care anymore.

According to Higher Education Dive, backers of the latest scheme include three vulture capital firms: Mudrick Capital Management (Madison Avenue in NYC), Greenvale Capital (London) and Bayside Capital (Miami/London).

Somehow, these VC firms will try to extract value from the bankruptcy deal. But how they do that is a mystery. C-suite executives have already gotten some of their bonuses, leaving little else for workers. Reducing labor costs (firing people) will be essential. Not paying their bills is another. Continuing to deceive consumers would be difficult to change. Even after the deal, 2U will still be laden with more than $400M in debt.

Since 2019, we have tried to expose 2U and its business practices, as well as the role of elite university partners in enabling the sale of advanced degrees and edtech certificates that led to few good jobs and lots of consumer debt. When they acquired edX from Harvard and MIT for $800M, we doubled down.

The Higher Education Inquirer has been the only outlet to name the elite schools that were complicit in this scheme that took money away from consumers just trying to get ahead. Not just USC, but Harvard and MIT, and Yale, and Cal Berkeley, and the University of North Carolina, and Syracuse, and Pepperdine, and many others. Check out the links below to learn more about how this higher ed scheme developed and collapsed. And how this is just the latest wave of edugrift.

Wednesday, February 21, 2024

Trump 2024 and the Student Loan Portfolio

The US Department of Education (ED) handles the student loans of about 40 million US citizens, holding on to about $1.6 Trillion in debt--which is considered an asset to the US government. And ED-FSA (Federal Student Aid) hires tens of thousands of workers, mostly contractors, to service the debt. But that could change in a few years. If Donald Trump is elected President.

Under President Trump, debtors might expect that their loans to be transferred over to large corporations--at some point--with the sale being used to reduce the federal deficit, and to cut labor at ED. This would aid in the effort to eliminate the US Department of Education, as Trump has promised on the campaign trail.

Selling off the student loan debt portfolio may or may not require approval from anyone outside of the President. At least one study, by McKinsey & Company, has already been conducted regarding this possibility.

In 2019, the Trump administration hired McKinsey to analyze the $1.5 trillion federal student loan portfolio. This analysis was part of a broader effort to explore options for managing the portfolio, including potentially selling off some of the debt. Results were never published. The analysis was conducted alongside a study by FI Consulting, which focused on the economic value of the portfolio, noting that the valuation could vary depending on future default rates, prepayment rates, and economic conditions.

The new owners of the sold off debt would most likely be big banks and other large companies, both domestic and foreign, that find value in the debt. There would be political and social resistance. And many questions would need to be answered, in detail.

Would large banks or other large corporations be better stewards of the debt?

Would the bidding be transparent?

Would consumers be able to challenge loan repayments or ask for forgiveness?

What would happen to the contracts of the existing debt servicers?

Will this expand the existing Student Loan Asset-Backed Securities market?

Wednesday, February 7, 2024

Robocollege Update

Robocolleges are a mix of for-profit and non-profit online colleges, both secular and Christian. Their focus is on automation and reduced costs, particularly labor costs:

Instruction is delivered through automated Learning Management Systems (LMS) and online platforms, relying less on professors and more on pre-recorded lectures and automated grading. Even support staff are being replaced by chatbots.

While some qualified individuals might be involved, educational content is often developed by large teams with varying expertise, potentially sacrificing quality for cost-effectiveness.

Marketing and advertising continue to be costly. But targeting marketing (e.g. targeting military service members and veterans, teachers, nurses, and government workers in low-income neighborhoods) can improve cost efficiency.

Robocolleges offer degrees with a wide range of value to consumers (return on investment versus debt). For people who need a degree (or an advanced degree) to play the game in government and medicine, these credentials may have value.

Competency-based education and credits for life experience reduce the number of courses some students need to graduate. Servicemembers going to Purdue Global, for example, can get an AA with as few as five college courses and a BS with as little as seven additional courses.

Cheating is probably easier for online students who are so inclined and whether these companies care is not really known.

Southern New Hampshire (SNHU) continues to be the growth and efficiency leader, with the highest enrollment, more than 160,000 students. SNHU is also experimenting with artificial intelligence to reduce labor costs. In addition, SNHU works with Guild (aka Guild Education), which recruits workers from Walmart, Target, Waste Management, and other large employers.

Grand Canyon (for-profit) and Liberty University (non-profit) target Christians for online credentials. But oppressive debt is a concern with some of their programs. Social mobility for students is subpar.

Purdue University Global and University of Arizona, Global Campus are two former for-profit colleges now owned by state universities. Information about their financial status is sketchy. Like SNHU, Purdue Global works with Guild to recruit working folks. Purdue Global owes its online program manager. Kaplan Education, about $128 million. Arizona Global has had financial difficulties which have affected the University of Arizona's bottom line.

The University of Phoenix has returned to profitability by reducing instruction and student services by $100 million a year and legal costs by $50 million a year. Consumers continue to file fraud complaints by the tens of thousands. And debt is an enormous problem with former students. It's not apparent whether Phoenix can maintain such enormous profits, but its future as a non-profit affiliated with the University of Idaho may reduce its tax burden and legal liabilities.

Here are the most recent numbers from the US Department of Education College Navigator:

American Intercontinental University: 89 full-time instructors for 14,333 students.
American Public University System has 332 F/T instructors for 48,688 students.
Aspen University has 27 F/T instructors for 7,386 students.
Capella University: 180 F/T for 39,727 students.
Colorado State University Global: 40 F/T instructors for 9,565 students.
Colorado Technical University: 55 F/T instructors for 24,808 students.
Devry University online: 61 F/T instructors for 26,384 students.
Grand Canyon University has 550 F/T instructors for 101,816 students.*
Liberty University: 735 F/T for 96,709 students.*
Purdue University Global: 337 F/T instructors for 45,125 students.
South University: 41 F/T instructors for 7,707 students.
Southern New Hampshire University: 130 F/T for 164,091 students.
University of Arizona Global Campus: 122 F/T instructors for 34,190 students.
University of Maryland Global: 177 F/T instructors for 55,838 students.
University of Phoenix: 80 F/T instructors for 88,891 students.
Walden University: 235 F/T for 42,312 students.

*Most F/T faculty serve the ground campuses that profit from the online schools.

Tuesday, January 16, 2024

My 2024 Higher Education Finance Reading List (Robert Kelchen)

[Editor's note: This article first appeared at the Kelchen on Education blog.]

As a department head, I typically only teach one class per year. This spring, I get to teach my PhD class in higher education finance again—the eighth time that I have taught it in my eleven-year faculty career. Each time, I have updated the readings considerably as the field is moving quickly and I figure out what works best for the students. I use articles, working papers, news coverage, and other online resources to provide a current look at the state of higher education finance.

The format that I have taught the class using has also changed frequently over time due to what works best for the program and other events of the past several years. Here are reading lists from previous years and how I have taught the class:

Summer 2023: Accelerated five-week format, mix of asynchronous and online synchronous

Spring 2022: Online synchronous, meeting one evening per week

Spring 2020: Met one Saturday per month, started out in person but moved to Zoom halfway through due to the pandemic

Fall 2017: In person, meeting one evening per week

This spring, I am back to teaching the class in person one evening per week for the first time in nearly seven years. Here is the reading list I am assigning my students for the course. I link to the final versions of the articles whenever possible, but those without access to an academic library should note that earlier versions of many of these articles are available online via a quick Google search.

The higher education finance landscape and data sources

Chetty, R., Friedman, J. N., Saez, E., Turner, N., & Yagan, D. (2017). Mobility report cards: The role of colleges in intergenerational mobility. Working paper. (link)

Schanzenbach, D. W., Bauer, L., & Breitwieser, A. (2017). Eight economic facts on higher education. The Hamilton Project. (link)

Webber, D. A. (2021). A growing divide: The promise and pitfalls of higher education for the working class. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 695, 94-106. (link)

Recommended data sources:

College Scorecard: https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/ (underlying data at https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/data/)

Equality of Opportunity Project: http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/college

IPEDS: https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/use-the-data

NCES Data Lab: https://nces.ed.gov/datalab/index.aspx

Postsecondary Value Commission’s Equitable Value Explorer: https://www.postsecondaryvalue.org/equitable-value-explorer/

ProPublica’s Nonprofit Explorer: https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/

Urban Institute’s Data Explorer: https://educationdata.urban.org/data-explorer/colleges/

Institutional budgeting

Barr, M.J., & McClellan, G.S. (2010). Understanding budgets. In Budgets and financial management in higher education (pp. 55-85). Jossey-Bass. (link)

Jaquette, O., Kramer II, D. A., & Curs, B. R. (2018). Growing the pie? The effect of responsibility center management on tuition revenue. The Journal of Higher Education, 89(5), 637-676. (link)

Rutherford, A., & Rabovsky, T. (2018). Does the motivation for market-based reform matter? The case of responsibility-centered management. Public Administration Review, 78(4), 626-639. (link)

University of Tennessee System’s FY2024 budget: https://finance.tennessee.edu/budget/documents/

University of Tennessee System’s FY2022 annual financial report: https://treasurer.tennessee.edu/reports/

UTK’s Budget Allocation Model (responsibility center management) website: https://budget.utk.edu/budget-allocation-model/

Higher education expenditures

Archibald, R. B., & Feldman, D. H. (2018). Drivers of the rising price of a college education. Midwestern Higher Education Compact. (link)

Commonfund Institute (2023). 2023 higher education price index. (link)

Griffith, A. L., & Rask, K. N. (2016). The effect of institutional expenditures on employment outcomes and earnings. Economic Inquiry, 54(4), 1931-1945. (link)

Hemelt, S. W., Stange, K. M., Furquim, F., Simon, A., & Sawyer, J. E. (2021). Why is math cheaper than English? Understanding cost differences in higher education. Journal of Labor Economics, 39(2), 397-435. (link)

Korn, M., Fuller, A., & Forsyth, J. S. (2023, August 10). Colleges spend like there’s no tomorrow. ‘These places are just devouring money.’ The Wall Street Journal. (link)

The financial viability of higher education

Britton, T., Rall, R. M., & Commodore, F. (2023). The keys to endurance: An investigation of the institutional factors relating to the persistence of Historically Black Colleges and Universities. The Journal of Higher Education, 94(3), 310-332. (link)

Ducoff, N. (2019, December 9). Students pay the price if a college fails. So why are we protecting failing institutions? The Hechinger Report. (link)

Jesse, D., & Bauman, D. (2023, November 13). This small college was out of options. Will its creditors give it a break? The Chronicle of Higher Education. (link)

Massachusetts Board of Higher Education (2019). Final report & recommendations. Transitions in higher education: Safeguarding the interest of students (THESIS). (link)

Sullivan, G. W., & Stergios, J. (2019). A risky proposal for private colleges: Ten reasons why the Board of Higher Education must rethink its plan. Pioneer Institute. (link)

Tarrant, M., Bray, N., & Katsinas, S. (2018). The invisible colleges revisited: An empirical review. The Journal of Higher Education, 89(3), 341-367. (link)

State and sources of revenue

Chakrabarti, R., Gorton, N., & Lovenheim, M. F. (2020). State investment in higher education: Effects on human capital formation, student debt, and long-term financial outcomes of students. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 27885. (link)

Gándara, D. (2023). “One of the weakest budget players in the state”: State funding of higher education at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis. (link)

Kelchen, R., Ortagus, J. C., Rosinger, K. O., Baker, D., & Lingo, M. (2023). The relationships between state higher education funding strategies and college access and success. Educational Researcher. (link)

Kunkle, K., & Laderman, S. (2023). State higher education finance: FY 2022. State Higher Education Executive Officers Association. (link)

Ortagus, J. C., Kelchen, R., Rosinger, K. O., & Voorhees, N. (2020). Performance-based funding in American higher education: A systematic synthesis of the intended and unintended consequences. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 42(4), 520-550. (link)

Tennessee’s outcomes-based funding formula: https://www.tn.gov/thec/bureaus/ppr/fiscal-policy/outcomes-based-funding-formula-resources/2020-25-obf.html

Federal sources of revenue

Bergman, P., Denning, J. T., & Manoli, D. (2019). Is information enough? The effect of information about education tax benefits on student outcomes. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 38(3), 706-731. (link)

Black, S. E., Turner, L. J., & Denning, J. T. (2023). PLUS or minus? The effect of graduate school loans on access, attainment, and prices. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 31291. (link)

Graddy-Reed, A., Feldman, M., Bercovitz, J., & Langford, W. S. (2021). The distribution of indirect cost recovery in academic research. Science and Public Policy, 48(3), 364-386. (link)

Kelchen, R., & Liu, Z. (2022). Did gainful employment regulations result in college and program closures? Education Finance and Policy, 17(3), 454-478. (link)

Ward, J. D. (2019). Intended and unintended consequences of for-profit college regulation: Examining the 90/10 rule. Journal of Student Financial Aid, 48(3), Article 4. (link)

College pricing, tuition revenue, and endowments

Baker, D. J. (2020). “Name and shame”: An effective strategy for college tuition accountability? Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 42(3), 1-24. (link)

Baum, S., & Lee, V. (2018). Understanding endowments. Urban Institute. (link)

Delaney, T., & Marcotte, D. E. (2023). The cost of public higher education and college enrollment. The Journal of Higher Education. (link)

Kelchen, R., & Pingel, S. (2023). Examining the effects of tuition controls on student enrollment. Research in Higher Education. (link)

Knox, L. (2023, December 4). Seeking an enrollment Hail Mary, small colleges look to athletics. Inside Higher Ed. (link)

Ma, J., & Pender, M. (2023). Trends in college pricing and student aid 2023. (link)

Webber, D. A. (2017). State divestment and tuition at public institutions. Economics of Education Review, 60, 1-4. (link)

Financial aid policies, practices, and impacts

Anderson, D. M., Broton, K. M., Goldrick-Rab, S., & Kelchen, R. (2020). Experimental evidence on the impacts of need-based financial aid: Longitudinal assessment of the Wisconsin Scholars Grant. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 39(3), 720-739. (link)

Billings, M. S., Clayton, A. B., & Worsham, R. (2022). FAFSA and beyond: How advisers manage their administrative burden in the financial aid process. Journal of Student Financial Aid, 51(2), Article 2. (link)

Dynarski, S., Page, L. C., & Scott-Clayton, J. (2022). College costs, financial aid, and student decisions. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 30275. (link)

LaSota, R. R., Polanin, J. R., Perna, L. W., Austin, M. J., Steingut, R. R., & Rodgers, M. A. (2022). The effects of losing postsecondary student grant aid: Results from a systematic review. Educational Researcher, 51(2), 160-168. (link)

Page, L. C., Sacerdote, B. I, Goldrick-Rab, S., & Castleman, B. L. (2023). Financial aid nudges: A national experiment with informational interventions. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 45(2), 195-219. (link)

Student debt and financing college

Baker, D. J. (2019). When average is not enough: A case study examining the variation in the influences on undergraduate debt burden. AERA Open, 5(2), 1-26. (link)

Black, S. E., Denning, J. T., Dettling, L. J., Goodman, S., & Turner, L. (2020). Taking it to the limit: Effects of increased student loan availability on attainment, earnings, and financial well-being. American Economic Review, 113(12), 3357-3400. (link)

Boatman, A., Evans, B. J., & Soliz, A. (2017). Understanding loan aversion in education: Evidence from high school seniors, community college students, and adults. AERA Open, 3(1), 1-16. (link)

Dinerstein, M., Yannelis, C., & Chen, C. (2023). Debt moratoria: Evidence from student loan forbearance. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 31247. (link)

Levine, P. B., & Ritter, D. (2023). The racial wealth gap, financial aid, and college access. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. (link)

Free college/college promise programs

Carruthers, C. K., Fox, W. F., & Jepsen, C. (2023). What Knox achieved: Estimated effects of tuition-free community college on attainment and earnings. The Journal of Human Resources. (link)

Gándara, D., & Li, A. Y. (2020). Promise for whom? “Free-college” programs and enrollments by race and gender classifications at public, 2-year colleges. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 42(4), 603-627. (link)

Monaghan, D. B. (2023). How well do students understand “free community college”? Promise programs as informational interventions. AERA Open, 9(1), 1-13. (link)

Murphy, R., Scott-Clayton, J., & Wyness, G. (2017). Lessons from the end of free college in England. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. (link)

Perna, L. W., Leigh, E. W., & Carroll, S. (2018). “Free college:” A new and improved state approach to increasing educational attainment? American Behavioral Scientist, 61(14), 1740-1756. (link)

Map of college promise/free college programs (Penn AHEAD) (link)

Returns to education

Conzelmann, J. G., Hemelt, S. W., Hershbein, B. J., Martin, S., Simon, A., & Stange, K. M. (2023). Grads on the go: Measuring college-specific labor markets for graduates. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. (link)

Darity, Jr., W. A., & Underwood, M. (2021). Reconsidering the relationship between higher education, earnings, and productivity. Postsecondary Value Commission. (link)

Deterding, N. M., & Pedulla, D. S. (2016). Educational authority in the “open door” marketplace: Labor market consequences of for-profit, nonprofit, and fictional educational credentials. Sociology of Education, 89(3), 155-170. (link)

Ma, J., & Pender, M. (2023). Education pays 2023: The benefits of higher education for individuals and society. The College Board. (link)

Webber, D. A. (2016). Are college costs worth it? How ability, major, and debt affect the returns to schooling. Economics of Education Review, 53, 296-310. (link)

Friday, September 29, 2023

2U-edX crash exposes the latest wave of edugrift

2U, a Lanham, Maryland-based edtech company and parent company edX, is facing layoffs of an estimated 200 to 400 workers--a significant number for a company that only employs a few thousand--amid more rumors that the company is for sale. While the pain of their firings may be consequential for those who are experiencing it, the pain of those the company has damaged, mostly striving middle-class consumers and their families, may be worse.

2U's problems are not new. The Higher Education Inquirer first reported on the beginning of company's meltdown in October 2019. In July 2022, 2U announced layoffs as it changed its business model (again) and the US Department of Education scrutinized the company's grad school offerings.

2U began in 2008 as an online program manager (OPM), one of a few companies offering edtech services that required large amounts of capital and labor costs. They expanded through the acquisition of other edtech firms, Trilogy Education Services (2019) and edX (2021). edX is an education platform that was created by Harvard and MIT as a massive open online course (MOOC) platform, but as part of 2U now concentrates on selling a number of elite and brand name tech bootcamps.

In 2022 and 2023, the Wall Street Journal (Lisa Bannon), Chronicle of Higher Education (Mike Vasquez), and USA Today (Chris Quintana) investigated 2U after a few US senators sounded the alarm about consumers being fleeced by 2U and other OPMs.

With 2U's reputation in shambles and layoffs ahead, the parent company wrapped itself around the more respectable edX brand. Bjju's, an Indian edtech firm, was said to be looking at 2U or Chegg as a possible acquisition (Byju's is now facing its own problems).

Concentrating on growth for years, then acquisition, then consolidation and rebranding, 2U has never generated an annual profit--and that trend doesn't appear to be changing.

Earlier this year we listed 2U, Chegg, Coursera, and Guild Education as part of the EdTech Meltdown.

Unlike the prior wave of for-profit college failures of Corinthian Colleges, ITT Tech, Education Management Corporation, and others that hurt working-class student debtors, 2U has collaborated with elite universities, targeting mostly middle-class folks for advanced degrees and certificates with elite brand names such as USC and UC Berkeley. Credentials that frequently are not worth the debt. Credentials that often did not lead to better paying jobs. Credentials that burden (and sometimes crush) consumers financially with private loans from Sallie Mae and others.

edX's website advertises coding, data analytics, cybersecurity, and AI bootcamps from a number of name brands: Ohio State University, Columbia University, University of Texas, Harvard University, Michigan State University, University of Denver, Southern Methodist University, University of Minnesota, University of Central Florida, Arizona State University, Northwestern University, Rice University, the University of North Carolina, and UC-Irvine.

Ohio State University AI Bootcamp $11,745
University of Texas Coding Bootcamp $12,495
Berkeley Extension Coding Bootcamp $13,495
University of Pennsylvania Cybersecurity Bootcamp $13,995
Columbia University Data Analytics Bootcamp $14,745

It's not clear how well managed the programs are and how much these schools are involved in instruction and career guidance. However, edX claims that with their bootcamp certificates, graduates will "gain access to more than 260 employers--including half of the Fortune 100--seeking skilled bootcamp graduates."

While the targets of for-profit colleges and 2U may have been different, their approaches were similar: sell a dream to consumers that often does not materialize. Spend tens of millions on targeted (and sometimes misleading) advertising and enrollment. Keep the confidence game going as long as it will last. But that may not be much longer.

In April 2023, 2U filed a lawsuit against the US Department of Education to avoid further government oversight. A familiar defensive strategy in the for-profit college business.

There is much we don't know about how significant the damage has been to those who bought the 2U story and spent tens of thousands on elite degrees and certificates, but it must be significant. Most US families do not have that kind of money to spend on something that doesn't result in financial gains.

Recent reviews of edX on TrustPilot have been scathing. And social media have been brutal on 2U, Trilogy, and EdX. Reddit, for example, has posts like "The dirty truth about edX/Trilogy Boot Camps." In a more recent post about edX, there was a flurry of negative reviews.

In 2016, we wrote "When college choice is a fraud." At that time we were focusing on the tough choices that working-class people have deciding between their local community college or a for-profit career school. Little did we know that the education business was already moving its way up the food chain and that edtech companies like 2U would be engaging in the latest form of edugrift.

Wednesday, August 30, 2023

Student Debt Relief Tool (Debt Collective)

Yesterday, we launched a new tool that files an appeal to the Department of Education to cancel each borrower’s student debt. All of the debt. Automatically. With the flick of a pen.

This type of tool has never existed before—until we created it and launched it yesterday. In the first 24 hours, more than 5,000 borrowers completed the tool.

If you haven’t filled out the tool yet, do it now so we can keep up our momentum. If you haven’t shared with a buddy or three, please pass it on. We want to reach our goal of twenty thousand applications submitted by Labor Day!

Fill out the Dispute Tool

Wednesday, July 12, 2023

University of Phoenix and the Ash Heap of Higher Ed History

(Updated September 14, 2023)

The University of Phoenix (or at least its name) may soon enter the ash heap of US higher education history--and rise again as a state-run robocollege. But it shouldn't--at least not yet. Once hailed as the leader in affordable adult education for workers entering middle management, it is a shell of its former self--in an economy less certain for workers and consumers.

With the school's wreckage are approximately one million people buried alive in an estimated $14B-$35B in student loan debt.

Pattern of Fraud

As of January 2023, more than 69,000 of these student loan debtors have filed Borrower Defense to Repayment fraud claims with the US Department of Education against the University of Phoenix (UoPX). Many more could file claims when they become aware of their rights to debt relief. In the partial FOIA response below, the US Department of Education reported that 69,180 Borrower Defense claims had been made against the school.

In a recent federal case, Sweet v Cardona, most if not all of the 19,860 "denied" cases were overturned in favor of the student loan debtors. We estimate the smaller number of fraud claims alone to amount to hundreds of millions of dollars.

Through a FOIA request, we also discovered 6,265 consumer complaints in the FTC database. In 2019, the FTC and the University of Phoenix settled a claim for $191M for deceptive employment claims. Based on the consumer complaints, we have no reason to believe that Phoenix has changed its behavior as a bad actor.

On May 3, 2023, six US Senators (Warren, Brown, Blumenthal, Durbin, Merkley, Hassan) called for the US Department of Education, Department of Veterans Affairs, and Department of Defense to investigate the University of Phoenix for launching a new program suggesting that it was a public university. The letter stated that the school "has long preyed on veterans, low-income students, and students of color."

Wolves in Sheep's Clothing

University of Phoenix's owners could potentially be liable for refunding the US government for the fraud. But as a state-related organization, it may be more politically difficult to claw back funds, no matter how predatory the school is.

Purdue University Global and University of Arizona Global set a precedence in state-related organizations acquiring subprime schools (Kaplan University and Ashford University) and rebranding them as something better. Whether they are better for consumers is questionable. Phoenix will have to cut costs, largely by reducing labor. Using Indian labor (like Purdue Global) and AI could be profitable strategies. It's likely that this deal, even if profitable, will add fuel to the growing skepticism of higher education in the US.

University of Phoenix's Finances

Apollo Global Management and Vistria Group currently own University of Phoenix but have been trying (unsuccessfully) to unload the subprime college for more than two years. Little is publicly known about the school's finances. What is known is that UoPX gets about $800M every year from the federal government, through federal student loans, Pell Grants, GI Bill funds, and DOD Tuition Assistance.

Despite this government funding, US Department of Education data show the school's equity value for the Arizona segment declined significantly, from $361M in FY 2018 to $187M in FY 2021.

$347M of the University of Phoenix's $518M in assets are intangible assets. Intangible assets typically include intellectual property and brand reputation. The school has $348M in liabilities.

The University of Phoenix has been reducing expenses by cutting instructional costs, from $70M in FY 2020 to $60M in FY 2021. UoPX spends about 8 percent of its revenues on instruction.

Marketing and advertising expenses are not available, but Phoenix has been visible on the Discovery Channel's Shark Week, CBS' Big Brother, and other television events. ISpot.tv reports that University of Phoenix spends millions of dollars each year on television ads. On one ad alone, the ad spend from February 2023 to July 2023 was an estimated $3.5M.

Attempts to Sell UoPX

There have been two known potential buyers for the University of Phoenix: the University of Arkansas System and the University of Idaho. In both cases, the owners required the potential buyers to keep the deal secret until the sale was imminent.

Fear of the impending higher education enrollment cliff appears to be an important pitch to potential buyers.

Arkansas, the first target, was in the process of making the deal, and it might have gone through if nit for the voice of one whistleblower and one outstanding investigative reporter, Debra Hale Shelton of the Arkansas Times.

In the case of Idaho, news of the potential deal was publicly noted just one day before the preliminary agreement was made with the Idaho Board of Education. Two other secret meetings were held before that.

A number of journalists including Kevin Richert (Idaho EdNews), Laura Guido (The Idaho Press), Troy Oppie (Boise State Public Radio), and Noble Brigham (Idaho Statesman) have exposed some of the problems and potential problems with the deal. In June, Idaho legislators began questioning the acquisition.

More recently, the opinion editor at the Idaho Statesman argued that the deal may actually be worthwhile.

Particulars about the finances are sketchy at best and misleading at worst. The University of Phoenix is said to include $200M in cash in the deal, but they have not said how much of that sum is required by law as "restricted cash"--money the school needs if the Department of Education needs to claw back funds. Phoenix also claims to be highly profitable, but without showing any evidence.

What is known about the deal is that the University of Idaho will have to borrow $685M and put its (bond) credit rating at risk. The school has not identified important information how the bonds would be sold (underwriters, bond raters, date to maturity, interest rate).

The University of Idaho has created an FAQ to answer questions about the sale, but HEI has identified a number of misleading statements about University of Phoenix's present finances (failure to report the school's equity), potential liability (cost of tens of thousands of Borrower Defense claims), and leadership (lack of background information about Chris Lynne, the President of the University of Phoenix). These deficiencies have been reported to the University of Idaho and to the Representative Horman.

On June 20, Idaho Attorney General Raul Labrador filed a lawsuit to halt, or at least slow down the deal.

The University of Idaho submitted a Pre-Acquisition Review from the US Department of Education, and it may take up to three months before the application is completed.

As of September 2023, the deal is far from done. Since this article was first published there have been a number of developments:

On September 11, US Senators Elizabeth Warren, Dick Durbin, and Richard Blumenthal called on University of Idaho President Green to abandon the sale. The Senators also asked Green if he had a plan to pay for the Borrower Defense claims, noting that University of Arizona may be on the hook for thousands of claims against Ashford University (aka University of Arizona Global campus).

In November, the Joint Finance-Appropriations Committee of the Idaho Legislature is expected to discuss the issue again.

*The Higher Education Inquirer has made a FOIA request for more up-to-date numbers from the US Department of Education. We have also filed FOIA requests with the FTC.