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Showing posts with label online education. Show all posts
Showing posts with label online education. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 5, 2025

University of Phoenix’s “TransferPath” App: Convenience or Marketing Hype?

The University of Phoenix has launched TransferPath, a mobile app promising prospective students a quick estimate of how many previous college credits might transfer toward a Phoenix degree. At first glance, it sounds like a win: upload your transcripts, get a pre-evaluation, and move faster toward completing your degree. The EdTech Innovation Hub article covering the launch presents the app as an unambiguously positive innovation—but a closer look raises serious questions.

The EdTech piece reads more like a press release than investigative reporting. It offers no insight into how pre-evaluations are calculated, whether faculty are involved, or how often initial predictions align with final credit acceptance. Without this transparency, students risk developing false confidence and making financial or academic decisions based on incomplete or misleading information.

The app also reflects the asymmetry of power between institution and student. While marketed as a convenience, it is ultimately a recruitment tool. The University of Phoenix controls which credits are accepted, and the app’s messaging may funnel students into its programs regardless of whether other paths would better serve their educational goals.

Missing from the coverage is context. Phoenix’s history as a for-profit institution has drawn scrutiny over retention rates, student debt, and degree outcomes. Presenting TransferPath without acknowledging this background creates a misleading narrative that the app is purely a student-centered innovation. Equity concerns are similarly absent. Students without smartphones, stable internet, or digital literacy may be excluded or misled. There is no evidence that the app serves all students fairly or that its credit predictions are accurate across diverse educational backgrounds.

TransferPath may indeed offer some convenience, but convenience alone does not equal value. Prospective students deserve clarity, honesty, and rigorous evaluation of how tools like this actually function. They need more than marketing optimism—they need realistic guidance to navigate the complexities of credit transfer, institutional incentives, and long-term outcomes.

Until such transparency and accountability are provided, TransferPath risks being more of a recruitment gimmick than a meaningful step forward in higher education.

Saturday, July 19, 2025

From EdTech Darling to Distressed Asset — A Post-Bankruptcy Autopsy

The fall of 2U, once a poster child of education technology innovation, is a cautionary tale for investors, policymakers, and students alike. After riding a wave of optimism in the online education bo-m, the company declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy in mid-2024, emerging weeks later as a privately held firm now controlled by distressed asset investors. While many of the company’s top executives have been replaced or reshuffled, the story is far from over—and the damage done to public trust in university–edtech partnerships remains.

Founded in 2008 and based in Lanham, Maryland, 2U positioned itself as a premier Online Program Manager (OPM), contracting with top-tier universities to run their online degree programs. By 2019, the company was a billion-dollar operation, boasting partnerships with USC, Georgetown, and Yale. But cracks began to show as questions about cost, transparency, student outcomes, and aggressive recruiting practices became harder to ignore.

By 2023, 2U was bleeding cash, facing multiple lawsuits, regulatory scrutiny, and plummeting investor confidence. The final blow came when the company defaulted on over $450 million in debt. In July 2024, 2U entered and quickly exited Chapter 11 bankruptcy through a pre-packaged deal. The result: 2U is now a private company, with ownership largely transferred to distressed debt investors—Mudrick Capital Management, Greenvale Capital, and Bayside Capital (an affiliate of H.I.G. Capital).

These firms are known not for a commitment to education but for expertise in distressed asset recovery and aggressive restructuring. Mudrick Capital, for instance, made headlines for its role in the AMC “meme stock” frenzy. Bayside Capital has long operated in the shadows of high-risk debt markets, favoring fast-moving deals in stressed financial environments. Greenvale Capital, a lesser-known but analytically rigorous hedge fund, rounds out the group.

Following the takeover, 2U appointed Kees Bol as its new CEO and installed Brian Napack—a veteran of the education sector and former CEO of Wiley—as Executive Chairman of the Board. Whether this new leadership can turn 2U around remains unclear. For now, they are signaling a pivot toward non-degree credentials and corporate upskilling markets, away from costly master’s degree programs that saddled students with debt and poor returns.

But 2U’s shift is not merely a business story. Its implosion exposes broader flaws in the higher education–tech ecosystem. OPMs like 2U operated in a legal gray area, exploiting Title IV federal student aid without direct regulatory oversight. Critics, including lawmakers and consumer protection advocates, argue that these firms served more as enrollment mills than academic partners. The Department of Education’s efforts to rein in the industry through “bundled services” guidance and potential Gainful Employment rules came too late to prevent massive financial fallout.

The universities that partnered with 2U are also complicit. Many ceded control of curriculum design, admissions, and marketing to a for-profit company in exchange for a share of the revenue. In doing so, they risked their reputations—and in some cases, knowingly funneled students into programs with dubious value. These relationships, many of which are still active, should now be reexamined in light of 2U’s restructuring.

Students who enrolled in these programs, often with the promise of career advancement and elite credentials, are left with debt and degrees that may not deliver the expected return. As 2U retools its strategy under the control of financial firms, it's unclear whether these students—or future ones—will benefit at all.

Meanwhile, the venture capitalists and financial engineers behind the scenes have already cashed out or secured their positions in the restructured entity. Like so many stories in the for-profit education sector, 2U’s downfall was not just predictable—it was profitable for those who knew how to play the system.

Have you worked with 2U—or been affected by it?

The Higher Education Inquirer is continuing its investigation into 2U and the wider online program management (OPM) industry. If you are a former or current employee of 2U, Trilogy Education, EdX, or a related company, a university staff or faculty member who collaborated with 2U, a student or graduate of a 2U-powered program, a marketing contractor, admissions specialist, or vendor affiliated with 2U or its partners, or someone with knowledge of the company's restructuring or operations—we want to hear from you.

We are especially interested in experiences involving enrollment pressure tactics, misleading marketing, internal operations, financial mismanagement, compliance concerns, and revenue-sharing agreements with universities. If 2U’s collapse or restructuring affected your job, finances, or education, your story matters.

You can share information confidentially by contacting us at gmcghee@aya.yale.edu. Anonymity will be protected upon request.

Friday, June 6, 2025

Consumer Alert: Lead Generators Still Lurking for Bodies

Predatory lead generators are still lurking the internet, looking for their next victims.  These ads continue to sell subprime online degrees from robocolleges like Purdue Global, Colorado Tech, Berkley College, Full Sail, Walden University, and Liberty University Online.  After you provide your name and number, they'll be calling you up.  But these programs may be of questionable value. Some may lead to a lifetime of debt.  Buyer beware.  

This ad and lead generator is originating from TriAd Media Solutions of Nutley, New Jersey.  


Down the rabbit hole...






Tuesday, December 17, 2024

Scam Artist or Just Failed CEO?

For eight years, this blog has been investigating greed and corruption in higher education at all levels, from predatory for-profit colleges and student loan servicers to elite university endowments. We have also highlighted the good people in higher education: those who promote transparency, accountability, value, justice, and empathy.

Over those years, we have gained a good number of friends and allies and received a small amount of negative feedback. When we did face staunch criticism, or in a few cases, threats, we had to consider the sources, who were always bad actors or those who worked for them. The bad actor, Christopher (Chip) Paucek, and his attorneys, have filed a federal litigation, suing this blog and its author for giving you, our valued readers, our opinion. Specifically, Paucek has taken exception to our characterization of him as a scam artist.

We stand by our opinion of Chip based on what we learned in more than five years of investigations of 2U, the company Paucek led for over 10 years. And we hope that more people will do their own investigations.  

We took our first look at 2U in 2019. In time, we were not the only ones paying attention. Workers in social media presented an inside view of the inner workings of 2U, describing what they viewed as enrollment practices that were highly questionable. Student consumers stepped forward, saying they had been deceived by 2U. Shareholders came forward, presenting Chip’s own words, saying he had misled them. The Wall Street Journal published a number of investigative pieces about 2U and the Chronicle of Higher Education also published two articles. While none of these outlets mentioned Chip, he was the CEO at the time, and in our view was responsible. 

By March 2022, Chip Paucek was still CEO of 2U, and was formally setting up the Pro Athlete Community, also known as PAC. There was nothing secret about this venture by this time. But it did seem to us questionable that a CEO of a large corporation would be formally setting up another for-profit organization while the one he was running was failing.  

In 2024, Chip admitted in an interview that he should have left 2U in 2019, but he didn’t. Chip also admitted that without his staying at 2U during that five year period, he wouldn’t have been able to start PAC. Last June, while still being paid as a consultant to 2U, a company nearly bankrupt, he led a group of retired players to ring the bell at NASDAQ. No one in the mainstream media picked up on the hypocrisy of all that exuberance on Wall Street. But we did.  

 

Chip’s lawsuit against us was a surprise on several levels. First, our statements were just our opinion–it’s not provable or disprovable. Second, it seems nonsensical to bother with a blog seen by only 25,000 people a month. Third, and most importantly, Chip Paucek’s track record in business could reasonably lead someone to believe he is, indeed, someone who says untrue things to his own benefit. 

Our feeling is that this lawsuit is more than a man taking exception to being called out for his track record; it’s, in our view, an attempt to keep us from warning his next potential victims–the athletes, employees, and investors who will be the next to learn about his methods. 

Many states (including New Jersey, where Chip filed suit) have a law to deal with situations in which someone uses the courts to squelch investigative journalism. Accordingly, we are pursuing an Anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) counter suit, asking for his case to be dismissed, and for him to pay our legal fees and court costs.  

On November 25th, David Halperin, an ally of ours for many years, let the public know that 2U is likely to be under investigation by the Federal Trade Commission and the California Attorney General. The company Chip left in 2023, but is still being paid by, as a special advisor. We are not surprised.  

If Chip would grant us an interview, we’d like to know more.

Related links:

“A Perverse Outcome”: Advocates Warn that 2U Bankruptcy Could Protect Executives at Students’ Expense (Student Borrowers Protection Center). 

Department of Education Must Protect Students Following Collapse of For-profit Education Company 2U (Project on Predatory Student Lending) 

A Hidden Risk of Online Higher Education (Student Borrower Protection Center) 

David Bernard v Climb Credit, University Accounting Services, Loan Science & 2U

2U Investors Reach $37 Million Settlement With Online Educator (Bloomberg Law)

Mounting Evidence from State Watchdog Report Proves That, Yet Again, Public Universities Are Selling Out Students to For-Profit Companies (Student Borrower Protection Center) 

USC Ends Partnership with 2U After Graduate Social Work Students Sue Over Online MSW “Diploma Mill” (Project on Predatory Student Lending)

Letter from CFPB to Richard Cordray about 2U

The Long, Steep Fall of an Online Education Giant (Wall Street Journal)

That Fancy University Course? It Might Actually Come From an Education Company.

USC Pushed a $115,000 Online Degree. Graduates Got Low Salaries, Huge Debts. (Wall Street Journal)

Thursday, November 21, 2024

The Roaring 2020's: For-Profit Education and Incarceration Profit from Trump Win

American investors are betting heavily on for-profit online education and mass incarceration. Shares of LRN (Stride), a company that operates cyber charter schools, have increased in value by about 60 percent over the last 30 days, reaching an all-time high today.  Stride has a number of institutional investors, including state employee and teacher retirement funds.  


Shares of GEO Group (GEO), an owner and operator of private prisons, have increased more than 90 percent over the last month. It also has a large number of big investors, including BlackRock, Vanguard, and Goldman Sachs.  


Saturday, November 9, 2024

Idaho-University of Phoenix deal has fallen below the radar

For more than four months, neither the University of Idaho nor the University of Phoenix have reported on the status of the proposed deal between the two parties. The last local media report, from the Idaho Ed News came in July, when the University of Phoenix said they were still committed to partnering with Idaho.

The University of Idaho's University of Phoenix Affiliation FAQ page has not been updated and some of the information is obviously outdated. For example, the webpage said that the UI-UoPX sale was expected to be consummated in early 2024. That did not happen.    

 

Screen shot of the University of Phoenix Affiliation FAQ on November 9, 2024. 

Legislative and judicial barriers have delayed the acquisition and the deal remains in limbo. 

In June, the U of I Board of Regents extended the Asset Purchase Agreement through June 10, 2025. The extension allows the University of Idaho to continue negotiating with the University of Phoenix and to incorporate feedback from stakeholders. It would appear that any sale would require approval from the Idaho Legislature, which meets again in January 2025. In the interim, many important questions remain unanswered.

Despite its commitment, Apollo Global Management, the University of Phoenix's parent company, could sell the school to another buyer. But there has been no public mention (or even hints) of an alternative suitor. Since 2021, Apollo has tried selling the school to a number of buyers, most notably Tuskegee University, UMass Global, and the University of Arkansas System. The only deal to be made public before Idaho was in Arkansas, where concerns about the sale led to the deal falling through.

Information on how the school could be purchased continues to be limited. After a previous bond deal in Arizona fell through, the National Finance Authority (NFA) agreed to participate in the UI-UoPX financing. But there is no public information about how the bonds would be structured. Moody's previously said the $685 million purchase could result in a "multi-notch downgrade" in the University of Idaho's bond rating. 

According to the US Department of Education, more than 900,000 University of Phoenix debtors owe about $21.6B in federal student loan debt. And there have been more than 73,000 Borrower Defense to Repayment (fraud) claims made against the school.

The University of Idaho has previously said that any federal obligations for Borrower Defense to Repayment claims would be handled in court, even though more than 19,000 cases have already been settled in federal court, in favor of the student loan debtors. No matter how this could be handled legally, lawsuits related to the University of Phoenix could tarnish the image of the University of Idaho.  

Friday, October 25, 2024

New higher education enrollment numbers: a mixed bag (Bryan Alexander)

How is higher education enrollment changing?

Today the National Student Clearinghouse Research Center published its first analysis of student numbers for fall 2024.  This is important data, as ever, and I’ll dig into it with this post.

It’s a mixed bag. Total enrollment rose, but a key indicator fell.

 National Student Clearinghouse Research Center logoi

One caution: this is the first such report for the semester, representing just over one half of the Center’s respondents’ data. They’ll revise this over the next few months.

The good news: total post-secondary enrollment rose 2.9% compared to fall 2023, with undergrad numbers rising 3% and grad school up 2.1%.   The heart of this growth is to be found in community colleges, who are using dual enrollment (teaching high school students) to rebuild their classes for the third year in a row.  For-profit colleges are also doing very well, seeing their numbers up 5%.

The main degree growth is not from graduate or undergrad degrees (not the BA, BS, MA, PhD, and so on), but from undergrad certificate seekers (a 7.3% rise).

There are other positive findings.  The sophomore retention rate (the proportion of first-year students who return for their second year) did better, as the drop out rate decreased.  Returning student numbers were higher.  In terms of race, all non-white populations enjoyed increased numbers: “Undergraduate and graduate enrollments for Hispanic, Black, Asian, and Multiracial students are seeing strong growth this fall.”  Historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) and Hispanic-serving institutions (HSIs) all saw increases. In terms of economic class, there were more students from the lowest economic quintile.

In terms of gender, there were no meaningful differences, as both male and female numbers rose at roughly the same amount.

Geographically, nearly all states enjoyed an increased in overall enrollment at the undergrad level:

enrollment 2024 fall by state_undergrad_ Clearinghouse

At the graduate level things were still rosy, although more mixed:

enrollment 2024 fall by state_grad_ Clearinghouse

Primarily online institutions (think Arizona State, Southern New Hampshire, Western Governors, etc.) saw enrollment rise by more than 6%.

Yet with all of these bright spots, the Clearinghouse shared some bad news.  First-year student enrollment dropped 5% overall.  This decline reversed gains made in 2023, taking things back to 2022 levels, and was especially pronounced in public and private four year institutions (-8.5% and -6.5%):

enrollment 2023-2024 first years Clearinghouse

In terms of age, “an almost 6% drop in the number of 18-year-old freshmen (a proxy for those enrolling immediately after high school graduation) accounts for most of the decline.”  In terms of economic class, this decline was especially true of state schools serving more Pell-eligible students, which saw drops of 10% and more.

Further, one negative sign of race and enrollment involves the caucasian population: “Undergraduate White students, on the other hand, continue to see enrollment declines (-0.6%).“  The Chronicle of Higher Ed generated this helpful and contrasting graphic:

enrollment higher ed by race 2024 fall Clearinghouse data_Chronicle viz

I and others who attended a briefing asked Clearinghouse staff to speculate on the decline.  Vice president for research Doug Shapiro thought multiple factors were in play: the FAFSA chaos, the attraction of the job market (unemployment being low), fear of student debt.  The Supreme Court ruling against academic affirmative action might have discouraged some minority students from applying, at least to elite institutions.

What might we take away from this report?

I need to preface my remarks by reminding readers that enrollment matters for two vital reasons.  To the extent that the United States wants more people to have more college study, the number of students who actually pursue higher education indicates how successful we are in reaching that goal.  And since we’ve effectively privatized most of higher education economics, student enrollment means essential revenue for keeping college and university doors open.

First, the Clearinghouse report is very good news for community colleges, who are enjoying growth after years of losses.  Their strategy of reaching into high schools is making up for their losses in the rest of their communities. It’s also good for for-profits, who saw their sector flattened during the Obama administration.

Second, certificates are in the lead.  The Center’s director told me that this sounds like a short-term trend, as the number of students pursuing shorter-term credentials is continuing to grow.  How many campuses will be inspired to expand their own certificate offerings as a result, sensing a growing market?

Third, there aren’t any clear signs of students responding to abortion policies.  That is, we might expect younger people (who tend to be more liberal) and especially younger women to avoid states with strict abortion bans, but the geographic data does not bear this out.

Fourth, in terms of how we think about higher education, the major developments here focus on the parts of academia which don’t normally get much attention or media buzz: for-profits, community colleges, certificates, online learning.  I don’t know if most academics in public and non-profit higher ed, and most Democrats, will be happy to see for-profits strengthen.

Fifth, this decline in first-year students could depress enrollments for years to come.  It might mean fewer sophomores next year, fewer juniors the year after, and so on.  Colleges will have to do heroic feats to boost retention, and high schools ditto to expand graduation and application, to nullify this issue.

Sixth, institutions which teach mostly online continue to grow. This is a long-running trend and feels likely (to me) to keep building up.

Seventh, it’s good to see higher ed actually grow after more than a decade of decline.  We’re still nowhere near the numbers we enrolled in 2012’s peak and have a long way to go before reaching that.  Meanwhile, America’s total population has grown, thanks to immigration, so we have farther still to go in reaching our peak proportion.

One last note: keep an eye out for updates to this data, as the Clearinghouse gets more evidence from its affiliated institutions.

This article first appeared at BryanAlexander.org

Monday, September 30, 2024

"White Labeling" in Online Higher Education: Simplilearn

Yesterday the NY Times published an article titled "Students Paid Thousands for a Caltech Boot Camp. Caltech Didn’t Teach It." The scandal is likely larger than this NYT article and the small, but important, bits of information in it. Simplilearn, the edtech company involved in the scheme, but not named in the title, is a growing for-profit business with offices in Bengaluru, India and San Francisco. 

What makes the story interesting for consumers and consumer advocates is that like 2U-edX, we find another online program manager, Simplilearn, peddling elite university certificates that may not work out for those seeking better work opportunities. What makes the story doubly interesting is that Blackstone, a company with a trillion dollars in assets under management, holds a controlling interest in Simplilearn. 

What makes it triply interesting (and not noted by the NY Times) is that GSV Ventures has also been involved in Simplilearn.  GSV Ventures includes a number of high-profile names in education, business, and edtech, including Arne Duncan, Johny C. Taylor, Jr., Michael Moe, and Michael Horn.  

Simplilearn also markets online certificates with other elite, brand names, including Purdue University, University of Massachusetts, Brown University, and UC San Diego. In June, Simplilearn stated that it was growing dramatically in revenue (35-45%) and becoming profitable. Consumers on Reddit, however, have made critical remarks about Simplilearn bootcamps. 


Students can use Splitit, ClimbCredit or Klarna for buy now, pay later financing. 

"White Labeling" in Edtech

According to edtech innovator and pioneer John Katzman (Noodle), "White labeling is done everywhere; your GE microwave is not made by GE, and Walgreens doesn't make ibuprofen. And note that these are non-credit, non-accredited programs. Still, I wouldn't put my university's name on other peoples' programs without clear disclosure. Tech and marketing are one thing; teaching and academic advisement are at the core of what a university does."

HEI Values Your Feedback

If there is anyone who has attended one of these bootcamps, please let us know how you financed the program and whether it has resulted in a positive or negative return on investment.


Related links:
Edtech Meltdown